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 1 
Abstract  
Networks and coalitions of stakeholders play a crucial role in the development and 
implementation of policies, with previous research highlighting that networks in tobacco 
control are characterised by an antagonism between supporters and opponents of 
comprehensive tobacco control policies. This UK-based study used quantitative and 
qualitative network analysis (drawing on 176 policy submissions and 32 interviews) to 
systematically map and analyse a network of actors involved in the development of European 
Union (EU) smoke-free policy. Policy debates were dominated by two coalitions of 
stakeholders with starkly opposing positions on the issue. One coalition, consisting primarily 
of health-related organisations, supported comprehensive EU smoke-free policy, whereas the 
other, led by tobacco manufacturers’ organisations, opposed the policy initiative. The data 
suggest that, aided by  strong political commitment of EU decision makers to develop smoke-
free policy, advocates supporting comprehensive EU policy were able to frame policy debates 
in ways which challenged the tobacco industry’s legitimacy. They then benefited from the 
stark polarisation between the two coalitions. The paper provides empirical evidence of the 
division between two distinct coalitions in tobacco policy debates and draws attention to the 
complex processes of consensus-seeking, alliance-building and strategic action which are 
integral to the development of EU policy. Highlighting network polarisation and industry 
isolation as factors which seemed to increase tobacco control success, the study demonstrates 
the potential significance and value of FCTC article 5.3 for tobacco control policy-making. 
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Introduction 
The investigation of public health policies is an integral part of public health research because 
political decisions considerably impact on population health. Stemming from a recognition 
that the development of effective public health policies require concerted effort from various 
stakeholders (Edwards, 2004; Heclo, 1975), the concept of policy networks, an approach 
which tries to capture the contribution of various actors in the development of policy, has 
received increasing attention among the academic community (Bomberg, Stubb, & Peterson, 
2008; Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 1997). Peterson and Bomberg (1999, p. 8) define a policy 
network as “a cluster of actors, each of which has an interest, or a ‘stake’ in a given […] 
policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure”. As complex, non-
hierarchical groups of mutually dependent actors that engage in policymaking (Heclo, 1975; 
Peterson, 2009), policy networks allow stakeholders with joint interests and similar values 
and positions to form alliances and jointly influence policymaking within a given area (Keck 
& Sikkink, 1998; Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). While some scholars have 
critiqued concepts of policy networks as being insufficient to provide explanations for policy 
change or yield detailed insights into the dynamics of policymaking (Dowding, 1994; 
Dowding, 1995), others have argued that the analysis of policy networks can increase 
understanding of policy outcomes (Marsh & Smith, 2000). (For detailed reflections on the 
concept of policy networks and its application in different legislative contexts, see, for 
example, Bessusi,(2006) or Börzel, (1998). Despite of disagreement in the academic literature 
about the explanatory power of the policy network concept, social network analysis (SNA) 
has emerged as a useful tool to map and analyse networks of interconnected actors. One of the 
major strengths of SNA is its compatibility with other methodological approaches and its 
malleability to different political concepts.  
Several scholars have highlighted the crucial role of networks and coalitions in the 
development and implementation of tobacco control policies (Cairney, 2007; Farquharson, 
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2003; Princen, 2007; Read, 1992). Their work suggests that policy networks in tobacco 
control are distinctly and unusually polarised and characterised by two groups which hold 
strongly opposing views and compete against each other when trying to advance their 
interests at the political level. Analysing the history of global tobacco control, Farquharson 
(2003, p. 90) argues that tobacco control policymaking is dominated by “two easily 
distinguishable and competing” alliances. She describes an anti-tobacco alliance of experts 
and activists who campaign for comprehensive tobacco control policy and whose views are 
diametrically opposed to those of  tobacco sector representatives who aim to influence 
“tobacco policy at all levels of government, ensuring that regulations […] are minimal” 
(Farquharson, 2003, p. 85). Elaborating on this idea, Smith (2013, p. 382) employs the term 
“tobacco wars” to describe the hostile debates between proponents and opponents of 
comprehensive tobacco control policy. A stark divide is also illustrated by articles describing 
Japanese (Sato, 1999), British (Arnott, Dockrell, Sandford, & Wilmore, 2007; Read, 1992), 
Scottish (Harrison & Hurst, 2005) and Irish (Currie & Clancy, 2011) tobacco control policy. 
Accounts of tobacco control policy suggest that opponents of tobacco control have 
historically been more successful in influencing national policies (Read, 1992; Sato, 1999), 
but that recently and with regard to smoke-free policies, tobacco control coalitions have 
emerged as a considerable counterforce against tobacco industry action (Arnott et al., 2007; 
Currie & Clancy, 2011; Drope, 2010; Harrison & Hurst, 2005). Cairney et al. (2011), who 
provide one of the most recent analyses of global tobacco control, confirm this shift in power 
within policy networks in tobacco control towards increasing recognition of public health and 
declining power of tobacco industry alliances.  
While the existing literature on stakeholder engagement in tobacco control policy 
offers useful insights into the antagonism in tobacco control policy debates, most of it is either 
dated or based on observational accounts of policy processes. No study to date provides 
empirical evidence or a systematic analysis of the composition and dynamics of policy 
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networks and coalitions of stakeholders involved in tobacco control, a gap which this study 
aims to fill. Applying concepts of policy networks and alliance-building to an empirical study, 
this paper analyses the engagement and collaboration of organisational stakeholders in the 
development of EU action to reduce exposure to second-hand smoke (SHS). The paper, which 
is the first to employ qualitative and quantitative SNA of documentary and interview data to 
explore EU public health policymaking, aims to assess the utility of SNA for developing a 
comprehensive understanding of the structure and formation of a policy network in EU 
tobacco control policy, shed light on the extent and dynamics of the schism between tobacco 
industry and tobacco control advocates and explore how the division developed in the context 
of EU tobacco control policy. Contrasting existing tobacco control research, which has 
overwhelmingly focused on tobacco industry interference, this paper adds a new perspective 
on the broader dynamics of tobacco control policy by providing empirical data on the overall 
policy network and exploring the complex set of social interactions that occur in the political 
environment.  
In the following section, the key events in the development of EU tobacco control and 
smoke-free policy are summarised. Then, the quantitative network analysis of 176 policy 
submissions and the qualitative analysis of 32 semi-structured interviews are described. After 
presenting findings on the policy network, its polarity, the position of EU institutions and the 
actions of tobacco control advocates, the paper discusses potential reasons for the structure, 
formation and dynamics of the network and outlines implications for tobacco control policy 
and practice.  
 
The development of EU tobacco control and smoke-free policy 
Despite its limited competence to adopt public health legislation, the EU has built a 
substantial track record of tobacco control policy. EU initiatives to tackle tobacco were first 
triggered by the Europe against Cancer Programme and the establishment of the Bureau for 
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Action on Smoking Prevention in the late 1980s, followed in subsequent decades by several 
directives concerning tobacco advertising, tobacco products and the exposure to SHS in the 
workplace. In 1989, negotiations were initiated concerning a Europe-wide tobacco advertising 
ban, which, after years of tobacco industry opposition, political deadlock and a court case in 
the European Court of Justice, came into force in 2006. At the same time, EU institutions 
negotiated larger health warning labels, disclosure of ingredients and additives, ceilings for 
tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide, and prohibition of misleading descriptors on cigarette 
packaging, leading to the European tobacco products directive in 2001.  
Despite demonstrating considerable public health successes, the history of EU tobacco 
control policy provides overwhelming evidence of tobacco industry opposition to, and success 
in delaying, modifying and preventing, effective tobacco control policies (Bitton, Neuman, & 
Glantz, 2002; Mandal et al., 2009; Neuman, Bitton, & Glantz, 2002; Smith et al., 2010). 
Strategies included lobbying policymakers, contesting the policy process and legal challenges. 
An increased awareness of industry interference has led public health advocates to fight for 
the exclusion of tobacco industry representatives from tobacco control policy debates 
(Corporate Accountability International & NATT, 2008; International Union Against 
Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, 2012; World Health Organization, 2009). Calls are frequently 
made with reference to article 5.3 of the World Health Organisation Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which requires parties to protect tobacco control policies “from 
commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national 
law” (World Health Organization, 2003, p. 7), an obligation assumed by the EU in becoming 
party to the FCTC in 2005.        
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
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The EU level process of developing policy to tackle exposure to SHS in workplaces 
and public places (summarised in Table 1) began with the release of a Green Paper by the 
Directorate General for Health and Consumers of the European Commission (DG SANCO) in 
January 2007, which outlined the harms caused by SHS and potential policy options to tackle 
the problem via the action of EU institutions (DG SANCO, 2007a). DG SANCO initiated a 
broad public consultation process, generating a total of 311 submissions, including 176 
organisational responses (DG SANCO, 2007a). Many submissions expressed support for EU 
action, with 60% favouring comprehensive EU smoke-free policy without exemptions (DG 
SANCO, 2007b). In a November 2007 consultation report, the European Commission 
declared its commitment to assisting EU member states in implementing comprehensive 
smoke-free legislation (DG SANCO, 2007b). In the following months, DG SANCO 
commissioned a report analysing the proposed policy options (Scoggins, de Vries, Conklin, & 
Hatziandreu, 2009) and established an Inter-Service Steering Group to support work on the 
impact assessment (DG SANCO, 2008). As part of the impact assessment, DG SANCO 
invited stakeholders to a targeted consultation (DG SANCO, 2008), resulting in 38 interest 
representatives (of which 25 represented health and social organisation, 13 industry and one a 
UK-based smokers’ rights organisation) attending two consultation meetings on 19 March 
2008 (DG SANCO, 2008). On 30 June 2009, DG SANCO published an impact assessment 
report (DG SANCO, 2009a) and a proposal for a Council Recommendation on smoke-free 
environments (DG SANCO, 2009b). The proposal, which recommended EU member states to 
adopt comprehensive smoke-free policies, was transmitted to the Council of the EU and the 
European Parliament and adopted with minor amendments on 30 November 2009 by the 
Council (Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs) (Council of the European 
Union, 2009).  
 
Methods 
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This study was conducted at the University of Edinburgh, UK, between October 2009 and 
December 2012. Publicly available policy documents of relevance to the process of adopting 
EU smoke-free policy (earlier drafts of the policy, responses and opinions produced by EU 
institutions, minutes of meetings, consultation submissions, briefings, reports, surveys, 
research reports and other documents) were reviewed. The consultation submissions of 176 
organisational actors were selected for quantitative network analysis. Textual data from these 
submissions were extracted and converted into relational data. Each organisation submitting a 
response to the public consultation was registered as a node. Each node was assigned a 
number of attributes, including the type and main focus of the organisation, its member state 
affiliation and primary focus on national, EU or global politics and its position on the policy 
proposal. In order to identify proxies for a general willingness of organisations to collaborate, 
their employment of similar arguments and active collaboration at an operational level, the 
following assumptions were made: two submitting organisations were assumed to have some 
kind of relationship if: (i) organisation B was mentioned as a collaborating partner on the 
website or in the submission of organisation A; and/or (ii) organisation A cited three or more 
references in its submission which were also cited in the submission of organisation B; and/or 
(iii) an analysis using plagiarism detection software showed that the submission of 
organisation A was at least 40% identical to that of organisation B. The data were analysed 
using UCINet Version 6 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) and graphically depicted using 
NetDraw (Borgatti, 2002). This procedure allowed graphical mapping, and systematic and 
quantitative analysis, of the structure and composition of the policy network.  
Qualitative data were gathered through 32 semi-structured, narrative interviews with 
decision makers, stakeholders and other individuals involved in the development of EU 
smoke-free policy. Interviewees were selected using purposive sampling from a list of key 
individuals who had been identified as involved in the development of EU smoke-free policy 
via the review of publicly available documentary data. 48 individuals were contacted, of 
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which six declined and five did not respond. 35 individuals were interviewed (Table 2), 
including decision makers (i.e. politicians and civil servants), representatives of public health 
advocacy organisations, scientific institutions, professional bodies, social partner 
organisations, the tobacco, ventilation and other commercial sectors. The documentary review 
and a number of informal pre-pilot conversations informed the development of an interview 
topic guide. The topic guide included a narrative part and questions on the interviewees’ 
involvement in the development of EU smoke-free policy. Interviews took place between 
March and July 2011 and lasted, on average, 60 minutes. Each interviewee’s preferred level 
of confidentiality was recorded and their informed consent was obtained. Interviews were 
transcribed verbatim and analysed using QSR NVivo Version 7 (QSR International, 2007). 
Responding to respective requests, six interviewees cross-checked their interview transcripts 
or individual quotes that were taken from their interviews, resulting in minor changes to the 
wording of the transcripts. A hermeneutic analytical procedure was developed which involved 
an iterative process of identifying themes, coding and repeatedly comparing them across sub-
samples and thematically analysing the data until the analysis of additional interviews did not 
generate substantively deeper insights, suggesting that data saturation had been reached and 
data collection could be ended (Gaskell, 2000). The interviews helped to tease out knowledge 
from political insiders and gain more detailed information about the policy network, 
stakeholder engagement, actor constellations and reasons for and barriers to engagement. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative analysis and different data sources helped to compare 
and contrast different accounts and develop a comprehensive understanding of the network of 
actors involved in the development of EU smoke-free policy. Ethical approval for the study 
was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Edinburgh School of 
Health in Social Science. For a detailed description of, and reflection on, the methodology, 
see Weishaar et al. (2015).  
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[Insert table 2 here] 
 
Findings 
The 176 consultation responses to the Green Paper included responses from 86 health-related 
organisations, 35 tobacco industry organisations, 36 national, regional or local authorities, 16 
social partners, two EU institutions and one representative of another industry sector 
(description of organisations based on categorisations undertaken by DG SANCO (2007b)). 
The quantitative network analysis showed that half of all stakeholders (n=88) were part of the 
main component of the network, whereas the other actors (n=88) either had no relationships 
with any other organisation that had submitted a response (n=70) or were members of smaller 
network components (n=18). The smaller components and isolates mainly consisted of social 
partners, EU institutions, and national, regional and local authorities, whereas the main 
component was almost exclusively made up of health-related and tobacco industry 
organisations. Two distinct alliances were identified by applying the Girvan Newman 
algorithm to split the main component into groups based on their connectedness within the 
network (Girvan & Newman, 2002). In line with claims about the division of stakeholders in 
tobacco control policy, one group (hereafter: Supporters’ Alliance) consisted almost 
exclusively of health-related organisations (i.e. health NGOs and health promotion 
organisations, scientific organisations, organisations representing medical professionals, 
pharmaceutical companies), which collaboratively supported comprehensive EU smoke-free 
policy without exemptions and largely referred to FCTC article 8 and the respective 
guidelines for implementation to support their calls. The other group (hereafter: Opponents’ 
Alliance) consisted of tobacco industry organisations (i.e. transnational tobacco companies, a 
tobacco trade association and a tobacco trade union), which largely opposed the policy 
initiative and argued for exemptions for the hospitality sector and other venues (Figures 1 and 
2). The interview and documentary data showed that the members of the Opponents’ Alliance 
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seemed motivated by a desire to advance their economic interests, whereas the members of 
the Supporters’ Alliance fought for strong public health measures and against what they 
perceived as undue interference of tobacco industry actors in EU smoke-free policy.  
 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
Figure 1: Policy network, organisations’ position on policy initiative 
Legend to figure 1 if grey shades are used: 
Black: Opposing comprehensive EU smoke-free policy, Grey: Supporting comprehensive EU 
smoke-free policy, White: n/a 
Legend to figure 1 if shapes are used: 
Square: Opposing comprehensive EU smoke-free policy, Circle: Supporting comprehensive 
EU smoke-free policy, Up triangle: n/a 
 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
Figure 2: Policy network, type of organisations 
Legend to figure 2 if grey shades are used: 
Black: Tobacco industry organisation, Dark grey: Health-related organisation, Light grey: 
national, regional or local authority, White: Social partner organisation 
Legend to figure 2 if shapes are used: 
Square: Tobacco industry organisation, Circle: Health-related organisation, Up triangle: 
national, regional or local authority, Circle in box: Social partner organisation 
 
The division of the network was largely based on officially reported relationships between the 
organisations that had submitted a consultation response. In line with this, interviewees 
recalled having activated pre-existing relationships and structures when lobbying for EU 
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smoke-free policy, suggesting that the divided structure of the network reflected a more 
general, long-standing disunion between health-related and tobacco industry organisations.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
A systematic comparison of the two groups (Table 3) showed that the Supporters’ Alliance 
was more than 2.5 times larger than the Opponents’ Alliance. While both alliances displayed 
similarly low density1 scores (suggesting a high number of inactive contacts, relatively low 
levels of cohesion and slow dissemination of information), densities within each alliance were 
a lot higher among a group of central actors that seemed to exchange information and draft 
texts and collaborate closely on the issue of EU smoke-free policy. Collaboration within both 
alliances seemed to be facilitated by key organisations which held strategic positions in the 
alliance and took the lead in the lobbying campaign. The members of the Supporters’ Alliance 
reflected on the strategic guidance of a core group of European tobacco control and public 
health organisations, which were crucial in facilitating collaboration. The Opponents’ 
Alliance, on the other hand, had a higher degree of centralisation and a more hierarchical 
structure and seemed primarily led by the Confederation of European Community Cigarette 
Manufacturers.  
 The interview data clearly confirmed the distinct division of the network, with 
interviewees describing stakeholders as being “on the left side or […] on the right side” 
(public health advocate) and their interactions as “water and fire” (analyst). They 
emphasised that the positions of the two coalitions were “black and white and right and 
wrong”, allowing “no shades of grey, nothing in between” (public health advocates) and no 
scope for consensus. Many members of the Supporters’ Alliance even seemed to feel that 
                                                 
1 Density calculations measure the proportion of all possible connections between two actors that are present in a 
network or a group, providing an index of the degree of paired connection in a population (Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005). Density measures network cohesion, with information assumed to pass quicker through a highly dense 
network than a network with a low density score (Provan, Harvey, & de Zapien, 2005).   
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compromise was undesirable and that “reaching some middle ground consensus” (public 
health advocate) between the two groups would be alarming. Asked about the reasons for the 
stark division, members of the Supporters’ Alliance used very strong imagery to describe that 
the tobacco industry’s core business was to increase profits by marketing cigarettes and that 
their interests were therefore diametrically opposed to effective tobacco control policy and the 
underlying values of those supporting comprehensive smoke-free policy.  
[The polarity exists] because [tobacco is] a product that kills half of all of its long-term 
customers. …And you know, the tobacco industry are promoting [and] marketing a lethal 
product to our children. …They are merchants of death, you know. (public health 
advocate) 
The vested interests of the tobacco industry and past experiences with tobacco industry 
interference in tobacco control policy were drawn on to argue that tobacco industry 
representatives were bound to hamper effective EU smoke-free policy. Tobacco control 
advocates argued that tobacco industry representatives “should not be treated as normal 
stakeholders“ or “have the place to be influencing” public health policy debates, thereby 
providing an additional frame for the division between the two groups and for the 
comparatively higher value of the Supporters’ Alliance’s input. They drew on FCTC article 
5.3 to substantiate their claims that tobacco industry representatives were not to be consulted 
on EU smoke-free policy and should be excluded from the policy debates. In contrast, 
stakeholders affiliated with the tobacco industry argued that tobacco industry exclusion 
contravened democratic principles and highlighted that political procedures had to be 
transparent, allow everyone affected to express their opinion and ensure equal treatment. 
Interviewees reported that the opposing views of the two alliances resulted in “real 
animosity” (social partner representative), reluctance to interact and “an iron wall of no 
discussion” (lobbyist).    
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 While the sociogramme of two clearly separate groups provided a graphical depiction 
of the two alliances’ strongly contrasting positions on the policy initiative and the 
fundamental controversy regarding the legitimacy of stakeholders in the policy debates, it also 
drew attention to three organisations which bridged the gap between the two coalitions. The 
bridge consisted of a German trade association (in the middle), which was a member of a 
German public health umbrella organisation (a member of the Supporters’ Alliance) and also 
linked through membership with a German tobacco manufacturers’ representative (a member 
of the Opponents’ Alliance). The interview data showed that the German public health 
organisation seemed less strongly opposed to tobacco industry engagement in the policy 
debates and more sympathetic to the views of tobacco industry representatives than other 
members of the Supporters’ Alliance. Interviewees reported that the organisation was of the 
opinion that tobacco industry representatives had to be “heard as an affected party” (public 
health advocate), suggesting that the bridging organisation was far more accepting of 
consultations with tobacco industry representatives than more central members of the 
Supporters’ Alliance, who argued that tobacco industry representatives should not be 
“asked”, “consulted”, “involved” or “have an input” in the development of smoke-free 
policy. A possible explanation for all bridging organisations being based in Germany might 
be that their positions in the network mirror the higher acceptance of the tobacco industry in 
German society and politics (Grüning & Gilmore, 2007; Grüning, Gilmore, & McKee, 2006).  
 From the start of the policy process, the European Commission indicated its 
commitment to effective smoke-free policy by acknowledging the detrimental effect of 
exposure to SHS, the potential positive effects of comprehensive smoke-free policies, the 
EU’s obligations under FCTC, the inadequacy of existing national and EU policies and the 
need to develop EU policy (DG SANCO, 2007a). Accordingly, interviews indicated that DG 
SANCO representatives and other EU decision makers, who held key positions in the policy 
process, were largely supportive of comprehensive EU smoke-free policy, showed 
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considerable commitment to push for EU level action and were in regular contact with 
members of the Supporters’ Alliance to exchange information and consult on the issue. 
Brussels-based advocates reported that the international negotiations on FCTC article 8 had 
mobilised DG SANCO representatives to develop EU policy to tackle the harm caused by 
SHS. DG SANCO’s expressed will to transform FCTC article 8 into EU policy seemed to 
result in considerable action to develop comprehensive smoke-free policy and encouraged 
those in favour of EU level action to support the initiative. A public health advocate recalled:  
 [We were not…] so much…pushing for the recommendation [but] it was something that 
DG SANCO wanted to do. They seemed to think that even though the article 8 guidelines 
had been adopted, those guidelines needed to have, kind of like, a specific EU imprimatur if 
you like and an official endorsement. …So once they said that they were going to do that, 
then we were happy to weigh in support. (public health advocate) 
In addition to the European Commission, other EU institutions emerged as supporters of 
comprehensive EU smoke-free policy during the policy process. The Council of the EU’s 
response to the Green Paper, for example, acknowledged “the need for Community guidance 
to further promote tobacco-smoke free environments at EU level” (Council of the European 
Union, 2007, p. 14), and the European Parliament resolution was even more supportive, 
calling for EU legislation to ban smoking in all workplaces and for other measures to reduce 
exposure to SHS (European Parliament, 2007). 
Mirroring the political will to advance smoke-free policy, calls by the Supporters’ 
Alliance for tobacco industry exclusion in line with requirements under FCTC article 5.3 
received support from staff at the European Commission. However, representatives of EU 
institutions were faced with difficult decisions regarding the consultation of tobacco industry 
representatives in the policy process. Decision makers reported that they had to respect formal 
obligations under the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Union, 1997), the European 
Commission’s minimum standards for consultation (European Commission, 2002) and the 
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impact assessment guidelines (European Commission, 2005), and thus needed to widely 
consult stakeholders on the issue. One member of the Supporters’ Alliance acknowledged the 
difficulties that decision makers were faced with as they continuously balanced conflicting 
demands and interests in the regulation of a legal product: 
“It’s all legal products. ….It’s not a banned product. […Decisions about how to deal with 
the tobacco industry] are walks on the tightrope and you always have…to see that you 
abide by the democratic rules of the game.” (public health advocate) 
The challenges in terms of finding modes of consultation that were aligned with the European 
Commission’s commitments to consultation while abiding by FCTC article 5.3 became 
particularly apparent during the stakeholder meetings on 19 March 2008, which had been 
convened by DG SANCO “to seek input […] and obtain valuable information from 
stakeholders directly” (DG SANCO, 2008, p. 16). DG SANCO had initially issued separate 
invitations to industry representatives (e.g. representatives of tobacco, pharmaceutical and 
other companies) for a meeting with “business representatives” in the morning, and to 
European and international health experts, representatives of civil society organisations and 
social partners to a meeting in the afternoon (DG SANCO, 2008, p. 26). While holding two 
separate stakeholder meetings seemed a way of managing competing interests, DG SANCO’s 
a priori allocation of stakeholders emerged as an issue of dispute, was criticised for being 
“based on a type of pigeonholing or categorisation that was not comprehensible” (ventilation 
sector representative) and led to strong expressions of discontent. Some tobacco control 
advocates felt that holding a general industry meeting granted tobacco companies the same 
legitimacy as other industry stakeholders and contravened FCTC article 5.3. In order to isolate 
tobacco industry representatives, tobacco control advocates subsequently encouraged 
pharmaceutical sector representatives to refuse attendance at the industry meeting and 
persuaded European Commission representatives to allow them to attend the afternoon 
meeting. At the start of the afternoon meeting, a dispute emerged regarding the attendance of 
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a representative of FOREST, a British smokers‘ rights organisation (DG SANCO, 2008). 
Referring to FOREST’s history and its considerable reliance on tobacco industry funding 
(Ely, 1989; Evans, 1982; Smith & Malone, 2007; Thompson, 2012), public health advocates 
argued that FOREST represented tobacco industry interests and should be excluded from the 
meeting. Their complaints resulted in the meeting being divided, with representatives of 
public health organisations, social partners and the pharmaceutical industry attending the 
primary meeting, and the FOREST representative meeting with DG SANCO representatives 
separately afterwards (DG SANCO, 2008). 
 The data presented above provide evidence of public health advocates’ success in 
framing debates on tobacco industry engagement in the development of EU smoke-free 
policy. Interviewees reported that tobacco control advocates had not only been able to present 
themselves as credible and legitimate stakeholders but had managed to make their concerns 
heard regarding the need to restrict tobacco industry engagement and successfully directed the 
course of events. Interviewees postulated that key advocates had employed “a very calculated 
strategy” (public health advocate) aimed at isolating the tobacco industry and managed to 
“charge the whole debate in a highly moral manner” (ventilation sector representative) by 
presenting themselves “as ‘the good ones’” (ventilation sector representative). One member 
of the Supporters’ Alliance claimed that the vociferousness of tobacco control advocates had 
been instrumental in shifting decision makers’ perception whether certain commercial actors 
were able to make a valuable contribution to the policy debate and thus their consideration of 
these stakeholders’ positions:  
So that perception was changed […and what became important was…] whether you have 
a credible voice or expertise or input into the policy discussions about health or not. In the 
end, the commercial or the non-commercial nature of the organisation is secondary to 
whether that organisation has something positive to contribute to questions of health. 
(lobbyist) 
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Tobacco control advocates also highlighted that the final policy document was consistent with 
the position that had been pushed by the Supporters’ Alliance, making the development of 
“smoke-free […policy…] a success story”. Tobacco industry representatives, on the other 
hand, remarked that they had “not been successful in [obtaining] anything” they had 
requested. The interview and documentary data thus suggest that the Supporters’ Alliance 
emerged as the stronger, dominant and more successful alliance in the debates on EU smoke-
free policy. 
 
Discussion 
Previous work on stakeholder engagement in tobacco control has described the “adversarial 
nature” of tobacco control (Farquharson, 2003, p. 80). This study is the first to employ SNA 
to comprehensively map and systematically analyse a policy network in tobacco control. 
Using a mixed method approach to SNA, our paper not only provides empirical evidence that 
smoke-free is a policy area which is characterised by a stark division between two competing 
coalitions of stakeholders, but provides an in-depth analysis of the factors influencing the 
network’s polarity. Drawing on EU smoke-free policy as an example, the study highlights that 
stakeholders, holding starkly contrasting positions regarding the nature of the public health 
problem and potential policy solutions, split into two opposing stakeholder coalitions. One 
coalition primarily comprised of public health and tobacco control organisations supporting 
comprehensive EU smoke-free policy without exemptions, the other consisted of industry-
affiliated actors opposed to comprehensive policy measures. By providing valuable insights 
into EU tobacco control policymaking, the study suggests that SNA holds immense potential 
for exploring networks in public health policy and developing a better understanding of the 
“political determinants of health” (Bambra, Fox, & Scott-Samuel, 2005, p. 188). 
The analysis suggests that supporters of smoke-free policy were successful in 
promoting effective tobacco control policy, consistent with recent research which indicates 
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that tobacco control advocates are increasingly able to fight tobacco industry opposition 
(Cairney et al., 2011). Our findings indicate that stakeholders supporting comprehensive EU 
smoke-free policy deliberately nurtured the perception of a polarised network. Perceiving 
polarised debates about smoke-free policy and tobacco industry legitimacy as potentially 
benefiting the development of comprehensive EU smoke-free policy, tobacco control 
advocates focused debates on regulating tobacco industry engagement and successfully 
employed FCTC article 5.3 to substantiate their claims for tobacco industry exclusion from 
EU smoke-free policy development. Such calls seemed to be well received by key 
representatives of EU institutions, resulting in political perceptions that tobacco industry 
representatives would not constructively contribute to the policy debates. Indeed, framing 
debates around tobacco industry exclusion and thereby enforcing the polarised nature of the 
policy network seemed to be key factors in tobacco control advocacy success. By providing 
evidence that public health advocates successfully questioned the legitimacy of tobacco 
industry interests in EU tobacco control policy, the paper highlights that FCTC article 5.3 can 
provide a useful tool for tobacco control advocates to raise awareness of the vested interests 
of tobacco industry representatives and their potentially detrimental impact on tobacco 
control. It thus echoes tobacco control researchers and advocates, who stress the importance 
of FCTC article 5.3 for the development, adoption and implementation of successful tobacco 
control policy (Action on Smoking and Health UK, 2010; Crosbie, Sebrie, & Glantz, 2012). 
The analysis also suggests that debates on smoke-free policy seemed to lend themselves to the 
strategy of using FCTC article 5.3, and that respective arguments may therefore have been 
particularly persuasive in this instance.  
The analysis of the development of EU smoke-free policy draws attention to the 
receptiveness of EU decision makers to calls for tobacco industry exclusion and the strong 
political commitment to develop comprehensive EU smoke-free policy. By indicating that the 
well-disposed attitude and support of key decision makers offered opportunities for tobacco 
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control advocates to promote their interests and was essential for the adoption of 
comprehensive EU smoke-free policy, our study supports previous research which highlights 
political commitment and leadership as an important determinant of tobacco control policy 
success (Currie & Clancy, 2011; Mandal et al., 2009). Such findings suggest that the political 
venue in which a policy is negotiated and the degree of political leadership strongly influence 
the opportunities of stakeholders to engage in policy debates and build alliances. However, 
decision makers’ attitudes about the role of tobacco industry representatives in current EU 
tobacco control policy indicate that the situation with regard to policies on tobacco smuggling 
or product regulation may be different. Contrasting DG SANCO’s receptiveness to calls for 
tobacco industry exclusion from smoke-free policy debates, existing agreements between the 
European Commission and three major transnational tobacco companies (European 
Commission, 2004, 2007, 2010) provide evidence that other Directorate Generals of the 
European Commission openly collaborate with tobacco industry representatives on illicit 
trade and are less receptive to arguments which call for precautionary measures against 
tobacco industry interference (Liberman, 2012; Liberman, Blecher, Carbajales, & Fishburn, 
2011). It can thus be assumed that the structure and dynamics of policy networks in other 
areas of EU tobacco control policy differ considerably from the network presented in this 
paper. Whether FCTC article 5.3 can be equally applied to arguing against tobacco industry 
engagement in tobacco control initiatives tackling product regulation or illicit trade seems 
therefore questionable.  
While the study provides interesting insights into tobacco control policymaking, a 
limitation is its focus on policy development at an EU level and its relative disregard for the 
implementation of the Council Recommendation on smoke-free environments at national 
levels. The strong wording of the Council Recommendation, the political support for the 
policy and the seeming success of the members of the Supporters’ Alliance suggest that EU 
smoke-free policy is an example of a political ‘win’ in EU tobacco control. However, several 
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years after its adoption by the Council of Ministers, many EU member states still provide 
insufficient protection from exposure to SHS and major problems remain regarding 
implementation and enforcement of national smoke-free policies (DG SANCO, 2012; 
Directorate General Health and Consumers, 2013). A comparison of the formation, 
functioning and impact of national-level tobacco control networks could provide an 
interesting area of future research and help assess the success of those supporting public 
protection from SHS in arguing for tobacco industry exclusion and advancing comprehensive 
smoke-free legislation at national level.  
 
Conclusion 
Building on previous research on EU policymaking, this paper shows that SNA is a useful 
tool to investigate the constraints and opportunities of members of a policy network and 
provides valuable insights into the complex interactions that occur in the political 
environment. Drawing on EU smoke-free policy as a case study, the paper provides empirical 
evidence of the stark division of a network of actors involved in EU tobacco control policy 
and the ability of supporters of comprehensive EU smoke-free policy to frame debates, 
advance effective tobacco control and benefit from strong commitment of key decision 
makers to develop respective policies. It highlights how tobacco control advocates 
successfully built strategic alliances with decision makers who were sympathetic to their 
cause, employed FCTC article 5.3 to draw attention to the vested interests of tobacco 
companies, called for tobacco industry regulation in the policy debates, and eventually 
benefited from the stark controversies which they had fostered and pursued. Future research 
into the structure, context and degree of polarisation of policy networks in other legislatures 
and with regard to other tobacco control policies could confirm whether those supporting 
effective public health policy consistently dominate tobacco control debates and considerably 
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increase understanding of the factors which contribute to the development of successful 
public health policy.  
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Table 1: Timeline of events leading to the adoption of the Council Recommendation 
on smoke-free environments 
Date Event 
30 January 
2007 
European Commission Green Paper “Towards a Europe free from 
tobacco smoke: policy options at EU level” 
January - June 
2007 
Public consultation process on smoke-free policy 
November 
2007 
Report on the Green Paper Consultation, including a declaration of 
commitment to assisting EU member states in implementing 
comprehensive smoke-free legislation 
December 
2007 
Commissioning of a report and establishment of the Inter-Service 
Steering Group to analyse the proposed policy options 
19 March 
2008  
Targeted stakeholders consultation meetings 
30 June 2009 Adoption of the proposal for a Council Recommendation on smoke-
free environments and publication of impact assessment as an 
accompanying document 
30 November 
2009 
Adoption of the Council Recommendation on smoke-free 
environments  
 
Table 2: Types of interviewees 
Stakeholder category Number 
Public health advocacy organisation 13 
Decision makers 5 
Scientific institution 4 
Tobacco sector 4 
Social partners 4 
Other commercial sectors  3 
Ventilation sector  1 
Organisation representing health professionals 1 
Total 35 
 
Table 3: Social network measures for the two main groups of the network 
Network measures Opponents’ Alliance Supporters’ Alliance 
Size (number of nodes) 24 64 
Density 0.29 0.10 
Centralisation 44.7% 26.9% 
 
  


